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REGULATING VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IN THE
WAKE OF ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court, with its decision in Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition,' rejected cries from proponents of the regulation
of virtual child pornography and held two provisions of the Child Por-
nography Prevention Act of 1996 ("CPPA")2 unconstitutional. 3 Refusing
to incorporate the CPPA's ban on virtual child pornography under either
the Miller v. California4 or New York v. Ferber5 standards, the Court left
open the status of virtual child pornography as constitutionally protected
speech under the First Amendment. 6 In response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Free Speech Coalition, Representative Mark Foley claimed
that the Supreme Court "sided with pedophiles over children. 7 While
Representative Foley's statement may grossly overstate the decision,
8
some serious questions remain as to the government's ability to regulate
virtual child pornography in the wake of Free Speech Coalition.9
Rather than questioning the propriety of the Court's decision in
Free Speech Coalition, this comment will focus on the future of virtual
child pornography legislation in the aftermath of the Court's ruling. Part
I will examine the legal framework the Supreme Court used to decide
Free Speech Coalition. Part II will focus on the Court's decision in Free
Speech Coalition, highlighting the problem with fitting virtual child por-
nography into the rubric of Ferber. Finally, Part III will critically exam-
ine Congress's response to the Court's decision and will propose possi-
bilities for redrafting a statute to comply with the precedents set in both
Free Speech Coalition and Miller.
1. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
2. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243, 2251, 2252, 2252A,
2256 (1996) & 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1996). For the purposes of this paper, citations will be to CPPA,
18 U.S.C.
3. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258 (The Court found two of the CPPA's provisions
unconstitutional: 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)'s prohibition of material that "appears to be" of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct and 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D)'s prohibition of sexually explicit
material that "conveys the impression" that it is of a minor engaged in sex).
4. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
5. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
6. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256.
7. See John Schwartz, Swift, Passionate Reaction to a Pornography Ruling, N.Y. TtMES,
Apr. 17, 2002, at A18.
8. See Stephen V. Treglia, Lawyers and Technology: After Ashcroft Is Virtual Child Porn A
Crime?, 228 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2002), available at WESTLAW ALLNEWS library (claiming that reading
Free Speech Coalition to hold that virtual child pornography is now an area of protected speech is
misguided).
9. Id.
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I. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment demands that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech."' 0 Unless speech falls into one of
the categories accepted as being outside the First Amendment's veil of
protection, that speech is presumed to be protected." The government
may constitutionally regulate speech that does not fit within the defined
categories deserving of First Amendment protection.12 To do so, the gov-
ernment must show a compelling government interest making the legisla-
tion necessary and demonstrate that the statute is narrowly tailored to
achieving that interest. 13 Finally, even if a statute is narrowly tailored to
accomplish a compelling government interest, the statute may still be
unconstitutional if it is overbroad, thus proscribing a substantial amount
of protected speech. 14
Free Speech Coalition questions whether virtual child pornography
fits into one of the categories outside of First Amendment protection,
namely, child pornography.' 5 The Court's analysis focused on whether
Congress narrowly tailored the CPPA to accomplish the goal of protect-
ing children. 16 Overbreadth was also addressed in the Court's interpreta-
tion of the CPPA in Free Speech Coalition.'7 The Court's decision in
Free Speech Coalition demonstrates the judicial struggle and competing
interests involved in reconciling regulation of pornography within the
bounds of the First Amendment. In evaluating the CPPA's prohibition of
virtual child pornography, the Court squarely faced the problem of fitting
virtual child pornography into existing First Amendment law.'
8
This section will examine the Court's most notable attempt at defin-
ing obscenity law in Miller v. California,9 as well as the Court's efforts
to carve out a separate category of unprotected speech for child pornog-
raphy in New York v. Ferber.20 Following the discussion of the cases, this
section will also outline the CPPA provisions at issue in Free Speech
10. U.S. CONST. amend. L
11. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002) ("The freedom of
speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation,
incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.").
12. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 245-46.
13. Content-based speech is judged under strict scrutiny. Some commentators have argued that
the appropriate standard of review in Free Speech Coalition should be the balancing of interests test.
This inquiry is beyond the scope of this Comment. For more information, see Wade T. Anderson,
Comment, Criminalizing "Virtual" Child Pornography Under the Child Pornography Prevention
Act: Is It Really What It "Appears to Be?," 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 393,418-20 (2001).
14. See generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,612 (1973).
15. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 240.
16. Id. at 252-54.
17. Id. at 255-57.
18. Id. at 239-40.
19. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
20. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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Coalition. Finally, this section will briefly summarize the circuit courts'
struggles in interpreting the CPPA and the disparate results that led to the
Court's decision to grant certiorari.
A. Miller v. California
2 1
In Roth v. United States,22 the Supreme Court held that obscenity, as
a category of speech, falls outside the boundaries of First Amendment
23protection. Between Roth, in 1957, and the Court's decision in Miller v.
California, in 1973, the Court struggled to define obscenity and develop
a workable standard for identifying obscene speech.24 In fact, before the
Miller decision, even members of the Court expressed difficulty defining
obscenity. In his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio,25 Justice Stew-
art wrote, "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description;
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it
when I see it. ,,26 The struggle over the definition of obscenity con-
tinued for nearly a decade without any clear standard for identifying un-
protected obscenity.
Miller v. California marked the culmination of the Supreme Court's
attempts to determine the boundary between speech worthy of First
Amendment protection and unprotected obscenity.27 Miller delineates the
current standard of acceptable regulation of what Justice Harlan called
"the intractable obscenity problem." 28 In that case, the State of California
charged the defendant, Miller, with a misdemeanor for knowingly dis-
tributing obscene materials in violation of California law.29 Miller was
21. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
22. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
23. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484-85 (The Court found that "implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance." Thus, the
Court concluded that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press.").
24. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966).
25. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
26. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
27. Miller, 413 U.S. at 16.
28. Id. at 16 (citing Interstate Circuit Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting)).
29. Id. at 16-18. The defendant was charged under a California statute that provided in
relevant part:
§ 311.2. Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution; printing, exhibiting,
distributing or possessing within state:
(a) Every person who knowingly: sends or causes to be sent, or brings or
causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state
prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers to distribute, or has
in his possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute,
any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor.
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charged after he allegedly sent an unsolicited brochure containing ex-
plicit pictures and drawings of men and women engaging in sexual ac-
tivities to a restaurant owner and his mother.30 Finding that the State had
a legitimate interest in prohibiting distribution of obscene material, the
Court concluded that a state may constitutionally regulate obscenity
without violating the First Amendment.3 '
The Court limited the scope and definition of obscenity to apply
only to material depicting or describing sexual conduct.32 The Court also
found that for a regulation to be constitutional it must be "specifically
defined" in the statute.33 Finally, if the material challenged fits within
these guidelines, then the reviewing court would examine under the fol-
lowing test, which required that "[a] state offense must also be limited to
works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex,
which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which,
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value." 34 This test for obscenity, outlined in Miller, remains the con-
stitutional standard required of all obscenity statutes. However, almost a
decade later, the Court determined that obscenity laws were insufficient
to regulate some types of indecent material, namely child pornography.35
B. New York v. Ferber
36
Paul Ferber was criminally charged under a New York obscenity
statute after he sold pornographic films showing young boys masturbat-
ing to an undercover police officer.37 The statute prohibited the knowing
promotion of sexual performances by minors by distribution of material
depicting such performances. 38 The New York Court of Appeals found
§ 311. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(a) 'Obscene' means that to the average person, applying contemporary
standards, the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient
interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which
goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or
representation of such matters and is matter which is utterly without redeeming
social importance.
Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (1968)).
30. Miller, 413 U.S. at 18.
31. Id. at 18-20.
32. Id. at 24.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
36. 458 U.S. 747.
37. Id. at 751-52.
38. Id. at 751. At issue in Ferber was New York Penal Law § 263.15. In relevant part, the
statute read: "A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing the
character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes
[Vol. 80:2
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the statute unconstitutional because it failed to delineate the Miller re-
quirements for obscenity.3 9 However, in 1982, the Supreme Court re-
versed, deciding that the First Amendment did not protect child pornog-
raphy, and that a state could regulate the distribution of child pornogra-
phy wholly apart from the Miller obscenity standard. 4°
Upholding New York's regulation of child pornography, the Court
focused primarily on the harm to children created by the production of
child pornography. 41 The Court adopted five justifications for allowing
states greater latitude in regulating child pornography.42 First, the Court
found that the production of child pornography was intrinsically related
to the sexual abuse of children.43 Second, the Court determined that
sexually explicit material using children created a permanent record of
the abuse, which would harm the participants each time it was distrib-
uted.44 In addition, the Court concluded that the State's interest in pro-
tecting children from sexual exploitation in the creation of child pornog-
raphy could only be controlled by prohibiting the distribution of porno-
graphic materials produced using children.45 Third, the Court recognized
that the sale and distribution of child pornography sustained the market
for these kinds of materials and continued the exploitation of children in
production of pornography. 46 Fourth, the Court defended the statute's
proscription of speech on the ground that child pornography was of only
de minimis value. 47 Importantly, the Court noted that the First Amend-
ment protects the use of adult simulation if the depiction of children en-
gaging in sexually explicit conduct is necessary to add literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value to a work.48 And fifth, the Court found that
the earlier precedent did not preclude the exclusion of child pornography
as an unprotected category of speech.49
The Court concluded that states could constitutionally regulate child
pornography without regard to the Miller obscenity requirements because
of the harm to children intrinsic in the production of child pornography.5°
Justice White wrote, "The Miller standard, like all general definitions of
what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect the State's particular
sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age." "'Promote' means to procure, manufacture,
issue, sell." Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263 (1977)).
39. New York v. Ferber, 422 N.E. 2d 523, 525-26 (N.Y. 1981).
40. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
41. Id. at 759-60.
42. Id. at 756-64.
43. Id. at 756.
44. Id. at 759.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 761-62.
47. Id. at 762.
48. Id. at 762-63.
49. Id. at 763.
50. Id. at 756.
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and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sex-
ual exploitation of children.",51 Thus, the Court upheld the New York
statute as constitutional, and in doing so, created a new category of
speech beyond the bounds of First Amendment protection.52 Federal laws
passed in the wake of Ferber's ban on child pornography were largely
useful in combating child pornography. However, with the dawn of the
Internet and technological advances that led to the increasing availability
of child pornography in cyberspace, existing federal laws have become
increasingly impotent in dealing with the new technology.53
C. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
Before the enactment of the CPPA in 1996, Congress attempted to
regulate child pornography under a variety of statutes.54 However, with
advances in computer technology, the existing law left loopholes for
computer-generated images of children engaging in sexual acts, now
commonly known as virtual child pornography.55 Congress addressed the
growth of virtual child pornography in 1996 by enacting the CPPA, in-
cluding thirteen legislative findings regarding the ills of virtual pornog-
raphy, in an attempt to fill the void left by existing laws.56
To combat virtual child pornography, Congress amended the defini-
tion of "child pornography" to include computer-generated images of
minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct.57 With regard to virtual
images specifically, the CPPA defined child pornography inter alia as:
any visual depiction, including any.., computer-generated image...
where--
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor en-
gaging in sexually explicit conduct...
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented,
described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the
51. Id. at 761.
52. Id. at 773-74.
53. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 402.
54. See id. at 396-98 (discussing legislative attempts at regulating child pornography since the
1970s).
55. Id. at 402 (Existing laws covered only pornography produced using real children, thus
leaving a loophole for virtual child pornography. Furthermore, prosecutors had a difficult task in
convicting pornographers because the defendant could always provide reasonable doubt by
suggesting the material was produced using only virtual children.).
56. Id. at 403.
57. CPPA, 18 U.S.C § 2256(8) (1996).
[Vol. 80:2
2002] REGULATING VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 435
impression that the material is or contains a visual depic-
tion of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
58
The "appears to be" clause and the "conveys the impression" clause are
the provisions that were specifically at issue in Free Speech Coalition.
59
D. Circuit Courts' Interpretation of the CPPA
Since the CPPA's enactment in 1996, five cases, including Free
Speech Coalition, have made their way to federal appellate courts. 60 The
First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits upheld the constitutionality of
the CPPA.61 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit, in Free Speech Coalition v.
Reno,62 found that the CPPA failed to serve a compelling government
interest and was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.63
Each of the four circuits that upheld the CPPA's constitutionality
did so, in part, by extending the rationale of Ferber and its progeny.
64
These courts concluded that the secondary harm associated with virtual
child pornography was sufficient justification for limiting virtual im-
ages. 65 However, the Ninth Circuit refused to accept that there was a
"nexus" 66 between virtual child pornography and harm to children. Thus,
the Ninth Circuit declined to enlarge Ferber to include a constitutional
prohibition on virtual child pornography.67
As written, the CPPA does not fit neatly within the Miller obscenity
standard. Nor does the CPPA's ban on virtual child pornography follow
directly from the holding and rationale in Ferber. With the lower courts
diametrically opposed on the constitutionality of the CPPA, the time was
ripe for a final decision on congressional ventures into regulating virtual
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 241-42. Section 2256(8)(C) was not challenged by the
Coalition, but the majority opinion notes that it will likely fall under the Ferber standard since there
is harm to actual children in the distribution of morphed images. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 404
(Section 2252 was also amended to incorporate the definitions of § 2256 in criminalizing the "use of
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.").
60. See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d
912 (4th Cir. 2000); Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11 th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999).
61. See Fox, 248 F.3d 394; Mento, 231 F.3d 912; Acheson, 195 F.3d 645; Hilton, 167 F.3d 61.
62. 198 F.3d 1083.
63. Id. at 1096.
64. See Fox, 248 F.3d at 401; Mento, 231 F.3d at 919-20; Acheson, 195 F.3d at 650; Hilton,
167 F.3d at 69-71. The circuits were split not only as to the statute's constitutionality, but also as to
an appropriate standard of review. This inquiry is beyond the scope of this Comment and will not be
addressed.
65. Fox, 248 F.3d 394; Mento, 231 F.3d at 912; Acheson, 195 F.3d at 645; Hilton, 167 F.3d at
61.
66. See Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1094.
67. Id. at 1092.
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child pornography. Thus, the Court granted certiorari to Free Speech
68Coalition to quiet the debate.
II. ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION 69
A. Facts
The Free Speech Coalition ("the Coalition"), a California trade or-
ganization consisting of businesses in the adult entertainment industry,
artists, and authors, brought this facial challenge to the CPPA.70 Though
none of the groups or individuals who challenged the statute had been
charged, the Coalition feared their "adult-oriented" work might fall under
the prohibitions on virtual child pornography as defined by the CPPA.71
Thus, the Coalition brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
on the ground that the CPPA was vague and overbroad.72
The respondents brought the case, originally captioned as Free73 i
Speech Coalition v. Reno, in federal court in California. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. 74 In 1999,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, holding that
the CPPA was an unconstitutional ban on free speech protected under the
First Amendment.75 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2001.76
B. The Majority Opinion
With the split among the circuit courts, Free Speech Coalition pre-
sented the Court with an opportunity to settle the question over the
proper placement of virtual child pornography within the rubric estab-
lished by Miller, Ferber, and their progeny. Faced with this challenge,
the Court refused to equate the CPPA's ban on virtual child pornography
with the constitutionally permissible prohibition on real child pornogra-
phy under Ferber or obscenity under Miller.78 Moreover, the majority
rejected the government's assertion of any compelling interest justifying
68.. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 531 U.S. 844 (2001).
69. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
70. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 234.
71. Id.
72. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999).
73. No. C 97-0281VSC, 1997 WL 487758, at * 1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1997).
74. Free Speech Coalition, 1997 WL 487758, at *7.
75. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999).
76. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 531 U.S. 844 (2001).
77. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (upholding an Ohio statute criminalizing
possession of child pornography by extending Ferber to include limiting the market for child
pornography and protecting victims from ongoing showing of pornography); New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
78. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 240.
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regulation of virtual child pornography under the CPPA. 79 Finally, the
Court ruled that the CPPA, as written, was overbroad and thus unconsti-
tutional, as a substantial amount of protected speech could be chilled
under the statute. 80
First, the Court found that the CPPA could not be interpreted as a
supplement to the constitutional proscription of obscenity under Miller.
81
The Court found that the CPPA failed to include any connection between
the prohibited work and community standards of offensiveness. 82 In ad-
dition, the Court determined that the CPPA did not act as a supplement to
existing obscenity standards because it failed to account for the work's
literary, scientific, artistic, or political value.
83
Second, the Court refused to extend Ferber's ban on pornography
produced using real children to include the CPPA's prohibition on all
virtual child pornography. 84 As discussed above, constitutionally permis-
sible regulation of real child pornography under the Ferber line of cases
was originally justified because of the primary harm to children affected
during the production of child pornography.85 In the words of Justice
Kennedy, "The production of the work, not its content, was the target of
the statute. 86
Interpreting the Ferber holding and rationale narrowly, the Court
concluded that the CPPA's ban on virtual child pornography was not
simply an augmentation of Ferber necessitated by technological ad-
vances. Rather, the Court determined that, unlike Ferber, "the harm"
from virtual child pornography "does not necessarily follow from the
speech, but depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent
criminal acts.",87 This reasoning suggests that the Court will likely be
unwilling to accept the constitutionality of any legislative attempt to limit
virtual child pornography under Ferber and its progeny.
79. Id. at 251-55.
80. Id. at 256.
81. Id. at 251 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24) (Under the Miller obscenity test, the government
must show that, taken as a whole, the work in question: 1) appeals to the prurient interest; 2) is
patently offensive in ight of community standards; and 3) lacks any serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.).
82. Id. at 246.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 251.
85. The Ferber Court grounded its ruling to permit regulation of child pornography beyond
the confines of Miller because of the intrinsic harm to children in the productio'n of child
pornography. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. Conversely, in virtual child pornography, the impact on
children is secondary, i.e., child pornography whets the appetites of pedophiles or may be used by a
pedophile as an aid to lure children. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 242.
86. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 249.
87. Id. at 250.
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After concluding that the CPPA did not fit within any of the consti-
tutional categories of per se unprotected speech, the Court rejected the
government's assertions that the CPPA was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling interest.88 The government presented four arguments aimed
at convincing the Court that the CPPA should be upheld. Though the
reasoning is somewhat intertwined, the Court rejected each of these
claims, finding that two of the assertions failed strict scrutiny and two
suffered from overbreadth by prohibiting a substantial amount of pro-
tected speech. 89
The government argued that the CPPA was necessary to prevent
pedophiles from using virtual child pornography to seduce children. 90
The Court found this argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the
Court concluded that a pedophile might use many things, including video
games and candy, to seduce children. 9' Second, the Court found that
other laws, such as those that prohibit unlawful solicitation of a minor,
more closely regulate the unsavory use of virtual pornography. 92 Thus,
according to the majority, the CPPA was not narrowly tailored because
the protection of children from pedophiles might be accomplished
through less restrictive means.93
In addition to being needlessly restrictive, the Court also found that
the CPPA failed to serve the government's compelling interest of
protecting children from pedophiles. 94 Justice Kennedy wrote, "The evil
in question depends upon the actor's unlawful conduct, conduct defined
as criminal quite apart from any link to the speech in question. '95 The
Court similarly rejected the government's argument that virtual child
pornography "whets the appetites of pedophiles." 96 Again citing the
apparent disconnect between pornography and conduct, the Court con-
cluded that a tendency to cause illegal conduct was an insufficient
justification for limiting speech. 97 The majority's rejection of the gov-
ernment's asserted interests in protecting children from pedophiles high-
lights the Court's wariness to accept the causal connection between
virtual child pornography and harm to children.
98
88. See id. at 252.
89. Id. at 256.
90. Jd. at 251.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 251-52.
93. Id. at 252.
94. Id. at 253.
95. Id. at 252.
96. Id. at 253.
97. Id. at 253-54.
98. Id. at 244-46.
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In addition to repudiating arguments based on the assumption that
virtual child pornography enhances the likelihood of pedophilia, the
Court also rejected the government's assertions that the CPPA was
needed to enforce existing laws regulating child pornography.99 The gov-
ernment made two arguments, both rejected, aimed at convincing the
Court of the CPPA's necessity to ensure enforcement of Ferber's ban on
child pornography.' °° Both arguments centered on the premise that vir-
tual child pornography is indistinguishable from pornography using real
children. 10
First, the government claimed that because virtual child pornogra-
phy and actual child pornography are part of the same market, the Court
should extend the Ferber and Osborne rationales to include virtual child
pornography. 02 This would allow the government to better enforce the
existing ban on real child pornography by eliminating the market. 0 3 The
Court found this argument unpersuasive, reasoning that if the two were
truly indistinguishable, there would be no market for real child pornog-
raphy, as potential offenders could avoid prosecution by simply using
virtual images.104
Additionally, the government argued that technological advances
have made real and virtual pornography indistinguishable, in turn making
prosecution of real child pornographers impossible.' 05 In answer to both
of the enforcement arguments, the Court found that "[t]he Government
may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful
speech. ' °6 Citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma,"°7 the Court concluded that
the CPPA was overbroad because it regulated a substantial amount of
constitutionally permissible speech.
108
Though the government asserted the statute's inclusion of an
affirmative defense as a remedy to the overbreadth problem, the Court
found that the affirmative defense proved incomplete. °9 The defense
allowed a defendant to escape prosecution if he could prove that the ma-
terials were produced using adults and that they were not distributed in a
way that conveyed the impression that the material showed real chil-
dren. 10 The Court found, however, that since the statute only permitted
99. Id. at 254.
100. See id. at 249-54.
101. Id. at 249, 254.




106. Id. at 255.
107. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
108. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255-56 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612).
109. Id. at 256.
110. Id. at 255.
439
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such a defense for distributors, but not possessors, a significant amount
of protected speech would be restricted in the CPPA's attempt to distin-
guish real from virtual child pornography."l'
In addition to the "appears to be" clause of the CPPA, the Coalition
also challenged the "conveys the impression" clause.' 12 Like the "appears
to be" language of the CPPA, the Court also found that the "conveys the
impression" portion served no compelling government interest." 3 The
majority found the government's evidence insufficient to show any harm
in material merely pandered as containing child pornography.' l 4 Fur-
thermore, the majority found that the "conveys the impression" language
was overbroad because the statute prohibited the mere possession of ma-
terials that were pandered as child pornography." 5 In sum, the Court
concluded that the challenged portions of the CPPA were overbroad and
unconstitutional. 1 6 As such, the Court did not address the Coalition's
vagueness challenge.!
7
C. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Though Justice Thomas concurred with the majority, finding the
CPPA unconstitutional, he wrote separately to assert his view that the
prosecution rationale might serve a compelling government interest in
the future. 1 8 Justice Thomas noted that the government failed to produce
evidence that prosecution of real child pornographers was made impossi-
ble with the existence of virtual child pornography. 119 However, he ar-
gued that if technological advances caused such a result, the govern-
ment's interest in prosecuting offenders might justify increased regula-
tion of virtual child pornography.
120
D. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the
majority's holding that the CPPA was unconstitutional.'12 First, Chief
111. See id. at 256.
112. Id. This clause prohibits depictions of sexually explicit conduct that are "advertised,
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that convey the impression that the
material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." CPPA,
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (1996).
113. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256-57.
114. Id. at 257.
115. Id. at 257-58.
116. d. at 258.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
119. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
121. See id. at 267 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia joined in the dissent except as to
the paragraph outlining the legislative history, at pp. 271-72 n.2).
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Justice Rehnquist deferred to the legislative findings, contending that the
government had demonstrated a compelling interest in securing the abil-
ity to enforce child pornography regulations. 22 Second, Chief Justice
Rehnquist objected to the majority's judgment that the CPPA was over-
broad.123 Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued, the Court should inter-
pret the definitions of the CPPA narrowly to apply only to "the sort of
'hard core of child pornography' that we found without protection in
Ferber."'
24
In arguing to limit the CPPA's scope, the Chief Justice contended
that the statute's definition of "sexually explicit conduct" should be lim-
ited to images that are "virtually indistinguishable" from pornography
using real children.1 25 In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued to limit
the CPPA's prohibition against possession or distribution of work that
"conveys the impression" that it contains minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct to materials pandered as child pornography. 126 Further-
more, the Chief Justice concluded that the CPPA's "conveys the impres-
sion" language should be interpreted as limited to the "knowing" posses-
sion of materials containing depictions of real minors engaged in sexu-
ally explicit conduct or depictions that are virtually indistinguishable
from real children. 127 According to the Chief Justice, this narrow inter-
pretation of the "conveys the impression" clause would ensure that the
CPPA could only apply to those who pander child pornography or know-
ingly possess images of real child pornography. 128 Moreover, the narrow
interpretation of the CPPA in general would limit its application to only
"hard core" pornography.
1 29
E. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence in Part/Dissent in Part
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority's finding that the
"conveys the impression" provision of the CPPA was unconstitutional. 30
However, she opined that the "appears to be" clause should be held con-
122. Id. at 270-71 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 268 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a finding of overbreadth should
only be reserved for extreme cases where the statute in question cannot be remedied by a limiting
instruction (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613)).
124. Id. at 269 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 271-72 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 273 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that this limitation
would not limit possession of materials that contain only suggestive depictions of youthful looking
actors.).
128. See id. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 269-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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stitutional as applied to virtual child pornography. 3' Justice O'Connor
argued that the government has a compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren by regulating both actual and virtual child pornography. 32 Like
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor also deferred to the legislative
findings that virtual child pornography whets the appetites of pedophiles
and makes prosecution of child pornographers impossible.
33
Additionally, Justice O'Connor found the CPPA to be narrowly tai-
lored. 34 Rather than finding the CPPA unconstitutionally broad in its
sweep, Justice O'Connor argued that the statute should be interpreted to
apply only to those virtual images that are "virtually indistinguishable"
from pornography produced using real children. 35 Reading the CPPA's
"appears to be" clause closely, Justice O'Connor concluded that the stat-
ute was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest and
was not overbroad. 136 Thus, Justice O'Connor concurred with the major-
ity's finding that the "conveys the impression" clause was overbroad, but
concluded that the "appears to be" provision was constitutional as ap-




Taking the CPPA as a whole, the Court refused to find a sufficient
connection between the possession or distribution of virtual child por-
nography and the crime of child abuse. 138 Given the Free Speech Coali-
tion opinion, the issue of whether virtual child pornography can ever be
prohibited under the same justification and with the same force as Ferber
is questionable at best. Though the Court may not have eliminated the
possibility that an affirmative defense might save the statute,139 it seems
unlikely, given the current makeup of the Court, that five justices will
ever find a statute like the CPPA constitutional. 140 Thus, if the legislative
findings on the ills of virtual child pornography are correct, the chal-
lenge, at least for the government, then becomes finding a constitutional
means to regulate virtual child pornography.
131. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
prohibition on youthful adult pornography is unconstitutional and suggests that the provision be
stricken rather than finding the CPPA as a whole overbroad).
132. Id. at 263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. Id. at 263-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. See id. at 264-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. Id. at 264-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. See id. at 267 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 250-51 (2002).
139. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255-56.
140. But see id. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring) (implying that the prosecution problem, if
proven, might be a compelling enough interest).
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Within weeks of the Supreme Court's controversial decision in Free
Speech Coalition, Congress responded with its first attempt to address
the Court's ruling and began work on the Child Obscenity and Pornogra-
phy Prevention Act of 2002 ("COPPA").1 41 In keeping with Congress's
swift action following the Free Speech Coalition decision, COPPA
worked its way through the legislative process and the House passed the
bill on June 25, 2002 by a vote of 413-8.142 However, neither the Senate
companion bill, S. 2511,143 nor the House-passed measure 44 were taken-
up by the Senate before it adjourned sine die on November 20, 2002 for
the 2nd Session of the 107th Congress. 145 Given the rapidity of congres-
sional action in the wake of Free Speech Coalition, as well as the over-
whelming bipartisan support for COPPA, it is clear that the Court's rul-
ing touched a nerve, at least in the 107th Congress.
This comment will evaluate COPPA as a proposal for constitutional
regulation of virtual child pornography. After examining the constitu-
tional obstacles inherent in COPPA following Free Speech Coalition, I
will address the potential political obstacles to regulating virtual child
pornography constitutionally, and Congress's historical unwillingness to
consider the constitutionality of pending legislation. Finally, I will pro-
pose what I believe to be a constitutional solution for regulating virtual
child pornography under a Miller statute, demonstrating that enforcement
141. Representative Lamar Smith (R-Tex), Chair of the House Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, introduced the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act
of 2002 ("COPPA"), H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter COPPA], on April 30, 2002, two
weeks after the Court announced its ruling in Free Speech Coalition. Rep. Smith was elected to the
House of Representatives in 1986. He is a graduate of Yale University and Southern Methodist
University College of Law.
142. 148 CONG. REc. H3913 (daily ed. June 25, 2002).
143. Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002, S. 2511, 107th Cong. (2002);
see Thomas Legislative Service, Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, at http://thomas.-
loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:SN02511:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 1, 2003). The
Senate companion bill was introduced by Senator Jean Carnahan (D-Mo) on May 14, 2002. See
Thomas Legislative Service, Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, at http://thomas.loc.-
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107- :SN0251 1: (last visited Jan. 1, 2003).
144. See Thomas Legislative Service, Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 107:HR04623: @ @ @L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 1,
2003).
145. 148 CONG. REC. S11,801 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 2002). However, the Senate Judiciary
Committee held a hearing on child pornography on October 2, 2002, addressing legislation
confronting this problem. See Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting Our Children and the
Constitution: Hearing on S.R. 2520 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing]. In addition, the Senate introduced its own child pornography
legislation, the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Agtainst Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2002 ("PROTECT'), S. 2520, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter PROTECT], sponsored by Senators
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), which passed the Senate on November 14, 2002.
See 148 CONG. REC. S11,153 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002). No House action, however, was taken on
the PROTECT Act. See Thomas Legislative Service, Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress,
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/- bdquerylD?d107: 1 :./temp/-bd3pMf:@ @ @XVbss/dlO7query.html
(last visited Jan. 1, 2003).
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of existing obscenity regulation will likely catch and punish at least the
worst cases of even virtual child pornography.
A. The Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002
At a May 9, 2002 hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 146 Associate Deputy Attorney
General Daniel Collins outlined the task of revising the CPPA within the
confines of Free Speech Coalition.147 He said, "[W]e believe that the
Court's decision and the Constitution leave the Congress with ample
authority to enact a new, more narrowly focused statute that will allow
the government to accomplish its legitimate and compelling objectives
without interfering with First Amendment freedoms.' 48 In essence, the
goal of this new legislation was to formulate a congressional response to
the Court's decision in Free Speech Coalition. COPPA marked a con-
tinuation of Congress's attempt to bring virtual child pornography within
the rubric of Ferber's prohibition of pornography produced using real
children.4 9 :
In COPPA, the House honed in on some of the questions left unan-
swered after Free Speech Coalition. Following the lead of Justice Tho-
mas's concurrence, 150 Congress revised the stated purpose of the CPPA
with greater particularity. Moreover, COPPA also sought to capitalize on
the loopholes left after Free Speech Coalition by narrowing definitions
and supplementing its affirmative defense. 51 Ostensibly, this legislation
complied with the rules established for regulating virtual child pornogra-
phy by Free Speech Coalition.
COPPA purportedly sought to refine and narrow the scope of the
unconstitutional "appears to be" language of the CPPA in three ways.
52
Specifically, COPPA: 1) localized its stated purpose to enforcement of
146. Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002 and the Sex Tourism
Prohibition Improvement Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 4623 and H.R. 4477 Before the Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of Associate Deputy Attorney General Daniel P. Collins, on behalf of the Dept. of
Justice) [hereinafter House Hearing].
147. Id. at 3-9 (statement of Associate Deputy Attorney General Daniel P. Collins, on behalf of
the Dept. of Justice).
148. Id. at 6.
149. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2 (2002); see also Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 249-56
(The Government argued specifically that the virtual child pornography prohibited by the CPPA
should be treated the same as child pornography and thus is subject to regulation without regard to
value under Ferber and its progeny.).
150. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Tiechnology may
evolve to the point where it becomes impossible to enforce actual child pornography laws ... [and]
in the event this occurs, the Government should not be foreclosed from enacting a regulation of
virtual child pornography.").
151. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3.
152. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, preamble; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4-5.
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existing child pornography law, 2) redefined the scope of what consti-
tutes virtual child pornography, and 3) exploited the possibility that an
affirmative defense might save an otherwise overbroad statute. 5 In addi-
tion, COPPA attempted to address the Court's criticisms of the "conveys
the impression" language of the CPPA by devising a pandering provision
that would pass constitutional muster. 154 Thus, the recurring question of
whether the government can constitutionally proscribe virtual child por-
nography is focused on whether COPPA narrows the arena of affected
speech sufficiently to permit constitutional regulation.
First, COPPA concentrated its focus by limiting its stated purpose,
or government interest, to the enforcement of existing laws prohibiting
actual child pornography. 55 Congress found that enforcing existing law
is becoming increasing difficult because of the existence of virtual child
pornography. 56 As discussed at length in Part II, the government in Free
Speech Coalition advanced a number of theories for equating the CPPA's
ban on virtual child pornography with Ferber. With the majority unwill-
ing to accept these arguments, the government alternatively argued, inter
alia, that advances in technology were making it increasingly difficult to
prosecute purveyors of real child pornography due to the automatic de-
fense that the material was virtual, and thus not produced using actual
children.' 57 Though not ultimately accepted by the majority, Justice
Thomas's concurrence highlights the possibility that this "prosecution
problem" may someday justify the prohibition of virtual child pornogra-
phy. 58 Moreover, the dissenting justices in Free Speech Coalition also
descri be this narrow focus of the CPPA as a compelling government
interest sufficient to permit proscription of virtual child pornography. 159
COPPA outlined its stated focus in the Congressional Findings that
accompany the new amendments. 60 In his hearing testimony, Associate
Deputy Attorney General Collins claimed:
153. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4-5.
154. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5. COPPA's amended
pandering provisions will be outlined below. However, the attention of this Comment will be
directed at analysis of COPPA's amendments to the definition of child pornography and the scope of
COPPA.
155. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4.
156. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2.
157. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 254.
158. Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 267 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Congress has a compelling interest in ensuring
the ability to enforce prohibitions of actual child pornography.").
160. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2. Congress found the following:
(1) Obscenity and child pornography are not entitled to protection under the First
Amendment under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity), or New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography) and thus may be
prohibited.;
445
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(2) The Government has a compelling state interest in protecting children from
those who sexually exploit them, including both child molesters and child
pornographers. 'The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance,' New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (emphasis added), and this interest extends to stamping
out the vice of child pornography at all levels in the distribution chain. Osborne v.
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990).;
(3) The Government thus has a compelling interest in ensuring that the criminal
prohibitions against child pornography remain enforceable and effective. '[T]he
most expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be to dry
up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons
selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product.' Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760.;
(4) In 1982, when the Supreme Court decided Ferber, the technology did not exist
to: (A) create depictions of virtual children that are indistinguishable from
depictions of real children; (B) create depictions of virtual children using
compositions of real children to create an unidentifiable child; or (C) disguise
pictures of real children being abused by making the image look computer
generated.;
(5) Evidence submitted to the Congress, including from the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children, demonstrates that technology already exists to
disguise depictions of real children to make them unidentifiable and to make
depictions of real children appear computer generated. The technology will soon
exist, if it does not already, to make depictions of virtual children look real.;
(6) The vast majority of child pornography prosecutions today involve images
contained on computer hard drives, computer disks, and/or related media.;
(7) There is no substantial evidence that any of the child pornography images being
trafficked today were made other than by the abuse of real children. Nevertheless,
technological advances since Ferber have led many criminal defendants to suggest
that the images of child pornography they possess are not those of real children,
insisting that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the images are
not computer-generated. Such challenges will likely increase after the Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition decision.;
(8) Child pornography circulating on the Internet has, by definition, been digitally
uploaded or scanned into computers and has been transferred over the Internet,
often in different file formats, from trafficker to trafficker. An image seized from a
collector of child pornography is rarely a first-generation product, and the
retransmission of images can alter the image so as to make it difficult for even an
expert conclusively to opine that a particular image depicts a real child. If the
original image has been scanned from a paper version into a digital format, this task
can be even harder since proper forensic delineation may depend on the quality of
the image scanned and the tools used to scan it.;
(9) The impact on the government's ability to prosecute child pornography
offenders is already evident. The Ninth Circuit has seen a significant adverse effect
on prosecutions since the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Free
Speech Coalition. After that decision, prosecutions generally have been brought in
the Ninth Circuit only in the most clear-cut cases in which the government can
specifically identify the child in the depiction or otherwise identify the origin of the
image. This is a fraction of meritorious child pornography cases. The National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children testified that, in light of the Supreme
Court's affirmation of the Ninth Circuit decision, prosecutors in various parts of the
country have expressed concern about the continued viability of previously indicted
cases as well as declined potentially meritorious prosecutions.;
(10) In the absence of congressional action, this problem will continue to grow
increasingly worse. The mere prospect that the technology exists to create computer
or computer-generated depictions that are indistinguishable from depictions of real
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Already, defendants contend that there is reasonable doubt as to
whether a given computer image-and most prosecutions involve
materials stored and exchanged on computers-was produced with an
actual child or as a result of some other process. There are experts
who are willing to testify to the same effect on defendants' behalf.
Moreover, as computer technology continues its rapid evolution, this
problem will only grow increasingly worse. Trials will increasingly
devolve into jury-confusing battles of experts arguing over the
method of generating an image that, to all appearances, looks like it is
the real thing. 161
In recognition of this dilemma, Collins contended that COPPA effec-
tively narrowed its scope to only the compelling government interest of
ensuring that purveyors of real child pornography could be successfully
prosecuted. 162 According to Collins, the government could achieve this
circumscribed goal by prohibiting virtual child pornography that is virtu-
ally indistinguishable from pornography produced using real children.'
63
To address this more limited government interest, COPPA restricted
the definition of "child pornography" that the Supreme Court found con-
stitutionally suspect in Free Speech Coalition. 64 In addition, COPPA
attempted to remedy the affirmative defense attacked by the Free Speech
Coalition majority. 65 According to proponents of the bill, the compres-
sion of the definitions of what constitutes child pornography, coupled
children will allow defendants who possess images of real children to escape
prosecution, for it threatens to create a reasonable doubt in every case of computer
images even when a real child was abused. This threatens to render child
pornography laws that protect real children unenforceable.;
(11) To avoid this grave threat to the Government's unquestioned compelling
interest in effective enforcement of the child pornography laws that protect real
children, a statute must be adopted that prohibits a narrowly-defined subcategory of
images.;
(12) The Supreme Court's 1982 Ferber v. New York decision holding that child
pornography was not protected drove child pornography off the shelves of adult
bookstores. Congressional action is necessary to ensure that open and notorious
trafficking in such materials does not reappear.
Id.
161. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. The CPPA provided definitions for what constitutes "child pornography." CPPA, 18
U.S.C. § 2256(8). See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256, where the majority found the
challenged "appears to be" provision of the CPPA constitutionally overbroad. COPPA attempts to
remedy the constitutional problems of the CPPA, in part, by narrowing the definition of what is child
pornography from any image that "appears to be" of minor engaging in sexually explicit activity to
"a computer image or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from that of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct." COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3(a).
165. The Free Speech Coalition majority attacked the CPPA's affirmative defense as
"incomplete and insufficient" primarily because the affirmative defense failed to provide a defense
for possession. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256; see also House Hearing, supra note 146, at
5; COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3 (COPPA specifically addressed the Court's concern by including a
possession defense).
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with the augmented affirmative defense, would address the government's
interest in enforcing existing law while passing constitutional muster.'
66
Associate Deputy Attorney General Collins testified that COPPA
refocused on enforcing Ferber's prohibition of real child pornography in
five ways. 167 The first of COPPA's amendments was a revision of the
definition of child pornography to include only computer images or
computer-generated images. 8 Proponents of the bill claimed that this
narrowed focus addressed the major medium for transmitting child por-
nography. 169 According to COPPA's Congressional Findings and
Collins's testimony, most child pornography is trafficked over the Inter-
net and/or is found on computers. 70 Thus, by defining child pornography
to include virtual images on the computer, Collins argued, COPPA
would cover most of the material at the "core of the Government's prac-
tical concern." 7' Moreover, COPPA's circumscribed application to
cover only computer images implicated a suppression "not . .. of any
idea but rather to uses of particular instruments in a way that directly
implicate[d] the Government's compelling interest in keeping the child
pornography laws enforceable."'
' 72
Second, COPPA refined the definition of child pornography further
by substituting the unconstitutional "appears to be" language of the
CPPA with "virtually indistinguishable from that of a minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct.' 73 Collins argued that by limiting the applica-
tion only to images that "to an ordinary observer ... could pass for the
real thing," ensured that the government could successfully prosecute
purveyors of real child pornography.
74
COPPA further limited the scope of regulation for virtual child por-
nography by restricting prosecution of virtual child pornography to only
those images depicting "lascivious" simulated intercourse. 75 Thus, ac-
cording to Associate Deputy Attorney General Collins, COPPA would
not place limitations on movies such as Traffic, since "'simulated' sexual
intercourse would be covered only if... the depiction is 'lascivious' and
involves the exhibition of the 'genitals, breast, or pubic area' of any per-
166. See House Hearing, supra note 146, at 10-11.
167. Id. at 4-5.
168. Id. at4.
169. Id.
170. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2 6; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4.
171. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4.
172. Id.
173. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3(a)(B); see also Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 265, 268
(dissenters argued that the CPPA should be narrowly construed to apply to only images that are
"virtually indistinguishable" from a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct).
174. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5.
175. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3(b)(i).
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son."1 7 6 From the testimony, it seems evident that the intent of this provi-
sion was to respond to the Free Speech Coalition's concern for movies
and other artistic performances or representations that were prohibited
under the CPPA.
177
In conjunction with narrowing the focus of the government interests
and the definitions of what constituted child pornography, COPPA also
attempted to refine the affirmative defense in an effort to limit the reach
of the bill. 178 As discussed above, both the majority opinion and Justice
Thomas's concurring opinion expressly left open the possibility that an
appropriate affirmative defense might aid the constitutionality of the
CPPA. 179 Taking into account this opening, COPPA specifically ad-
dressed the stated insufficiencies of the CPPA's affirmative defense by
including a defense for possession or production of child pornography
requiring a showing that real children were not used in the production
thereof.180
The Free Speech Coalition majority found the CPPA's affirmative
defense insufficient to "save" the statute from being overbroad.' 8' The
majority criticized the CPPA's affirmative defense on two grounds.'
8 2
First, the Court determined that the affirmative defense failed to provide
a defense for possession. 83 "While the affirmative defense may protect a
movie producer from prosecution for the act of distribution, that same
producer, and all other persons in the subsequent distribution chain,
could be liable for possessing prohibited work.''84 Second, the Free
Speech Coalition majority found fault with the CPPA's failure to provide
an affirmative defense to producers of images created not using real chil-
dren. 85 COPPA specifically attempted to remedy these criticisms by
including a defense that the images were not created using actual chil-
dren. 186 Thus, under COPPA, a defendant charged with either possession
176. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 8 (quoting COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3(b)(i)).
177. Id. ("Notably, this change alone [the definition of sexually explicit conduct for simulated
intercourse] eliminates most of the overbreadth identified by the Court; it was the breadth of the
definition of sexually explicit conduct that led to distracting and unhelpful arguments over whether
movies such as 'Traffic' and 'American Beauty' were covered.").
178. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5; see also Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256 (finding the CPPA's affirmative defense to be "incomplete and
insufficient").
179. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256, 259-60.
180. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3(c).





186. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3(c) (amending the unconstitutional provision of the CPPA, 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(c), as follows: "[1]t shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating this
section that the alleged offense did not involve the use of a minor."); see also House Hearing, supra
note 146, at 5.
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or distribution of child pornography could assert an affirmative defense if
he could prove that no children were used in the production of the im-
age.1
87
COPPA also attempted to refine the provisions concerning pander-
ing of virtual child pornography by prohibiting any offer to purchase or
sell real child pornography without requiring proof that such material
actually exists. The challenged provision of the CPPA criminalized
sexually explicit depictions that were "advertised, promoted, presented,
described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression
that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct."' 89 According to Associate Deputy Attorney
General Collins, the Court criticized this provision because the "prior
law criminalized materials based on how they were marketed."' 90 In con-
trast, proponents of COPPA's new pandering provision suggested that
the bill moved the focus from how sexually explicit material is marketed
to the fact that sexually explicit material is marketed at all.' 91 According
to proponents of COPPA, this modification effectively responded to the
Court's sharp criticism of criminalizing as pandering any offer to buy or
sell child pornography. 1
92
B. COPPA's Constitutional Problems
Proponents of COPPA contended that the bill effectively narrowed
its focus and refineed the definitions and affirmative defense to accom-
plish the limited interest of enforcing the constitutional ban on child por-
nography produced using real children. If new legislation in the 108th
Congress successfully works its way through the legislative process and
becomes law, its constitutionality may again be challenged. While
COPPA arguably narrowed the unconstitutional provisions of the CPPA,
some clear problems still existed, and the constitutionality of new
COPPA-like legislation is tenuous.' 93 In fact, in a hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee on the subject of child pornography, two
witnesses, both law professors, claimed that COPPA, as drafted, was
187. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5.
188. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 4.
189. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 257 (quoting CPPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D)).
190. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5, 8 (statement of Associate Deputy Attorney General
Daniel P. Collins, on behalf of the Dept. of Justice).
191. Id. at 8.
192. Id.
193. Kurt Indvik, VSDA Says New Child Pornography Bill Will Likely Not Pass Judicial
Muster, VIDEO STORE, July 14, 2002, at 13, available at 2002 WL 24537763 (According to Sean
Bersell, Vice President of public affairs for the Video Software Dealers Association, "We have
looked at the house bill and we think that it would still fail the Supreme Court test under the Free
Speech Coalition case.").
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unconstitutional.194 Indeed, even Representative Adam Schiff, 95 a mem-
ber of the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security, expressed his view that COPPA might fail constitutional mus-
ter. 1
96
First, at least six justices have already rejected the government's ar-
gument for the "prosecution rationale," which is at the heart of COPPA' s
reworked provisions. 197 In Free Speech Coalition, the government ex-
pressly argued that the CPPA's provisions were necessary to prevent
purveyors of real child pornography from claiming an automatic defense
that the images were virtual and did not use real children.198 The majority
rejected this argument, stating: "The argument, in essence, is that pro-
tected speech may be banned as a means to ban unprotected speech. This
analysis turns the First Amendment upside down."'199 Moreover, even
though Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, expressed his view
that this prosecution rationale may one day prove sufficient to justify
limits on virtual child pornography, he noted that "the Government as-
serts only that defendants raise such defenses, not that they have done so
successfully ... this speculative interest cannot support the broad reach
of the CPPA.,,200 Thus, unless the government can point to defendants
who have been acquitted under a "virtual" defense, it is unclear whether
the Court will be willing to acknowledge any proscription of virtual child
pornography, under COPPA or similar legislation.20 '
Though COPPA may have narrowed its asserted purpose to enforc-
ing child pornography laws, little changed in the interim between Free
Speech Coalition and this proposed legislation. 2  In short, the govern-
194. Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statements of Frederick Schauer, Professor of the First
Amendment at Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and Ann Couglin, Class of
1948 Research Professor of Law at the University of Virginia Law School. They both testified that
COPPA was unconstitutional.).
195. Representative Schiff (CA-D) was elected to the United States House of Representatives
in 2000 following a four-year term as a state senator in California. Prior to holding elected office,
Mr. Schiff served in the United States Attorney's Office in Los Angeles, California. Representative
Schiff is a graduate of Stanford University and Harvard Law School.
196. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 15-16 (Statement of Rep. Adam Schiff) ("I think that
the problem of child pornography is such a serious one that the Supreme Court decision really has to
be addressed legislatively .... I think that this bill does do that. It's still, I think, going to be a very
close constitutional question, but I think it's one that we have to raise, if we're going to effectively
combat this problem.").
197. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 254-55.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
201. See id.
202. In fact, Congressional Findings supporting COPPA indicate that the technology to create
computer images virtually indistinguishable from real child pornography does not exist. COPPA,
H.R. 4623, § 2. For example, paragraph five states that "[t]he technology will soon exist, if it does
not already, to make depictions of virtual children look real," and paragraph seven states that
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ment has already tried to assert the prosecution rationale as a compelling
government interest, and it has failed.2 °3
However, even if the Court eventually accepts the prosecution prob-
lem as a justification for regulation of virtual child pornography, COPPA
still proscribed a substantial amount of protected speech; the question is
whether it was too much?2°4 Even though COPPA, at least on its face,
narrowed the scope of speech regulable as child pornography, instances
remain where potentially nonobscene virtual images of children are still
within the ambit of COPPA. Moreover, many of the purportedly nar-
rowed provisions of COPPA amount to little more than just a restatement
of the same definitions already found unconstitutional in Free Speech
Coalition."'
For example, COPPA allegedly restricted its reach by applying to
only computer images or computer-generated images.2 °6 In Free Speech
Coalition, a majority of the Court specifically found that the First
Amendment protects such images.20 7 Associate Deputy Attorney General
Collins argued that COPPA "extends not to the suppression of any idea
but rather to uses of particular instruments, such as computers, in a way
that directly implicates the Government's compelling interest in keeping
the child pornography laws enforceable., 20 8 However, there is no practi-
cal difference between the two since, according to COPPA's Congres-
sional Findings, most virtual child pornography is produced and trans-
mitted using computer technology.20 9
Moreover, videos, photographs, and other images fall within
COPPA's definition of child pornography so long as they are found on a
computer. 21° Thus, even a protected image might be subject to COPPA if
"[tlhere is no substantial evidence that any of the child pornography images being trafficked today
were made other than by the abuse of real children." Id. at V5, 7.
203. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 254-55.
204. See Indvik, supra note 193.
205. Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Ann Couglin) ("Indeed, it is difficult to
understand how the House bill could be interpreted as an effort to correct the defects in the CPPA
that were identified in Free Speech Coalition. Instead, the House bill seems to embody a decision
merely to reenact the CPPA all over again.").
206. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3.
207. See Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Ann Coughlin). Professor Coughlin
notes of the Free Speech Coalition decision, "In particular the Court concluded that the prohibitions
covered materials: (1) that were not regulable under Ferber because they were not the product of
child abuse ... and (2) that were protected by Miller because they were of serious literary, artistic,
scientific, or other value." Id.
208. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4 (statement of Daniel P. Collins).
209. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2.
210. See House Hearing, supra note 146, at 22-23 (Deputy Attorney General Collins, in
response to Congressman Schiff's questions, acknowledged that the COPPA covers videos and
photographs, or any image found on a computer.).
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it was found on a computer or created using computer technology.2 1' For
example, with the increased accessibility, economic benefits, and abun-
dance of the Internet, many movies already advertise trailers online. As
technology advances, it is not beyond imagination that movies and other
legitimate, and non-obscene, media may be available over the Internet.
Given the scope of COPPA's definition of child pornography, many of
the same concerns raised by the majority about the proscription of mov-
ies like Traffic and American Beauty might be proscribed under
COPPA.
212
In addition, by extending to all computer-generated images, COPPA
might reach documentaries on child sexual abuse, which use computer
graphics to avoid using real children, or even movies like Titanic or A.I.,
which have already used computer technology to supplement and even
213replace real actors.
Proponents of COPPA also argued that the scope of the bill was fur-
ther limited by confining the definition of child pornography to any
computer image that is indistinguishable from that of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct. 214 However, this very suggestion of restrict-
ing the CPPA to material indistinguishable from real child pornography
was proffered by the dissenting justices in Free Speech Coalition215 and
was rejected by the Court.216 Professor Schauer, in his testimony before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, criticized the addition of the "indistin-
guishable" definition:
Even if no person at all could tell the difference between materials us-
ing real children and materials using computer-generated images, the
absence of real children in the latter case is exactly why the Supreme
Court in Free Speech Coalition refused to find Ferber applicable, and
no degree of indistinguishability in [t]he image can create a real child
where none existed before.
217
Thus, it is at least questionable whether COPPA meaningfully solved any
of the constitutional flaws of the CPPA.21 s COPPA's acceptance of lan-
guage that was expressly rejected by the majority, and failure to provide
"any explanation for why this definition would be greeted by the Court
as an improvement over the definition it just rejected, 21 9 makes clear the
211. Id.
212. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 247-48.
213. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 393.
214. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4 (statement of Daniel P. Collins).
215. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 264-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), 268-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
216. See id. at 249-51 (dismissing the government's "virtually indistinguishable" construction
argument).
217. Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer).
218. See id.
219. Id. (statement of Ann Coughlin).
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difficulty in regulating virtual child pornography after Free Speech Coa-
lition. However, it is also clear that this new definition is highly suscep-
tible to the same kind of overbreadth challenge that plagued its predeces-
sor, the CPPA.22 °
In response to the potential overbreadth problems, COPPA also at-
tempted to accommodate Free Speech Coalition by revising the affirma-
tive defense found insufficient by the Supreme Court.22' Associate Dep-
uty Attorney General Collins suggested of the changes, "The affirmative
defense is explicitly amended to include possession offenses ... [and] is
also amended so that a defendant could prevail simply by showing that
no children were used in the production of the materials. Prior law only
granted an affirmative defense for productions involving youthful-
looking adults." 222 According to proponents of the bill, the narrowed
definitions of child pornography, in tandem with the supplemented af-
firmative defense, ensured that COPPA's prohibition of virtual child
pornography was not overbroad.223
According to the Vice President of Public Affairs for the Video
Software Dealers Association, however, COPPA's affirmative defense
amounted to little more than a burden-shifting device requiring the ac-
cused to prove his innocence by demonstrating that the images were not
produced using real children.224 Moreover, although the majority in Free
Speech Coalition refused to specifically address the question of whether
the affirmative defense could "save the statute,' 225 the Court suggested
that there exists "serious constitutional difficulties [raised] by seeking to
impose on the defendant the burden of proving his speech is not unlaw-
ful. '226 The Court also noted the difficulty of requiring a defendant to
prove his innocence after prosecution has begun. Justice Kennedy wrote
of the evidentiary dilemma, "Where the defendant is not the producer of
the work, he may have no way of establishing the identity, or even the
existence, of the actors. If the evidentiary issue is a serious problem for
the Government, . . . it will be at least as difficult for the innocent pos-
sessor. ' 227 Thus, even if COPPA's affirmative defense helped to suffi-
220. Id. (statements of Frederick Schauer and Ann Coughlin).
221. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3. The COPPA also restricts its scope for sexually explicit images
by requiring that simulated sexual intercourse be "lascivious" to violate the bill. Id. § 3(b)(B)(i).
However, based on the hearing testimony, this restriction appears to be primarily intended to cover
movies and other artistic performances, not virtual pornography. See House Hearing, supra note
146, at 8.
222. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5 (statement of Daniel P. Collins).
223. Id.
224. Indvik, supra note 193; see also Senate Hearing, supra note 194 (statements of Frederick
Schauer and Ann Coughlin).
225. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256.
226. Id. at 255.
227. Id. at 255-56.
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ciently narrow its reach, it is unclear that an affirmative defense can be
employed in the area of virtual child pornography to make an otherwise
suspect statute constitutional.228
In addition, Professor Coughlin also asserted that COPPA's affirma-
tive defense failed in substance.229 Professor Coughlin argued that
COPPA's affirmative defense was too broad and might create a loophole
for some defendants to escape criminal liability even for obscene mate-
rial.23 She suggested, "[T]he House bill proposes to put in place an
affirmative defense that could be read to authorize child pornographers
who produce and peddle materials that possess no redeeming social value
to escape prosecution on the ground that the materials were made with-
out using an actual minor.",23' Consequently, even if the constitutionality
of COPPA's affirmative defense was not at issue, the substance and one
potential loophole might compromise the validity of the statute.232
Finally, COPPA's amended provision on pandering 233 purported to
remedy the problems pointed out by the Court in Free Speech Coalition
by focusing on the act of marketing instead of on the character of the
234material. However, Congress's task in constitutionally regulating vir-
tual child pornography may not be as simple as suggested by Associate
Deputy Attorney General Collins.235 Again, attempts to regulate virtual
child pornography without regard to obscenity requirements could prove
fruitless. 6 Professor Schauer contends:
[COPPA] treats pandering as an independent offense without the ne-
cessity of a showing that the material pandered is in fact legally ob-
scene or is in fact child pornography made with the use of a real
child. In the absence of such a showing, the "advertising for an
unlawful transaction" rationale disappears, and the pandering provi-
sion appears instead as a prohibition on the advertising of an immoral
or unhealthy but lawful product, plainly protected by the First
Amendment under recent court rulings.
237
Once again, COPPA might be constitutionally suspect because of Con-
gress's repeated attempts to try to regulate virtual child pornography with
the same force of Ferber. After analysis, the best that can be said of
228. See Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer) (asserting the
Court's skepticism to use affirmative defenses in the area of child pornography).




233. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 4.
234. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5 (statement of Daniel P. Collins).
235. See Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer).
236. See id.
237. Id.
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COPPA is that it may still be unconstitutional. 38 Even proponents of
legislation attempting to regulate virtual child pornography in the after-
math of Free Speech Coalition acknowledged the potential failings of
COPPA. 39
Even if COPPA or a similar bill were passed into law in the 108th
Congress, the constitutionality of regulating virtual child pornography is
unclear at best. Some commentators have argued that Congress is grand-
standing or attempting to force defenders of the First Amendment to util-
ize limited resources in order to keep challenging the constitutionality of
statutes implicating First Amendment restrictions.24 Wendy Kaminer,
for example, said of Congress's response to Free Speech Coalition and
COPPA, "Maybe Congress and the White House doesn't [sic] care
whether laws like these are constitutional .... Maybe they care mainly
about getting credit for their passage (while draining resources of free-
speech organizations by forcing them to challenge unconstitutional
laws)., 241 This comment will not predict the future, but instead pose the
questions that are likely to be litigated in the lower courts. And indeed, if
passed, COPPA might suffer the fate of other statutes passed in response
to Supreme Court decisions by floundering in the lower courts.
24
2
Though the future of any COPPA-like statute is unclear, if history is any
indication, the constitutionality of such a bill will likely be challenged.
This is clearly an undesirable result.243 According to Professor Schauer,
"As the six-year course of litigation under the previous Act so well dem-
onstrates, constitutionally suspect legislation under existing Supreme
Court interpretations of the First Amendment ...puts the process of
prosecuting the creators of child pornography on hold while the appellate
courts proceed at their own slow pace. While there may be room in
the Constitution for symbolic legislation, "for Congress to enact sym-
bolic but likely unconstitutional legislation would have the principal ef-
238. Id. (statements of Frederick Schauer and Ann Coughlin asserting that COPPA was likely
unconstitutional and the provisions amounted to little more than a second attempt at the same
provisions of the CPPA that the Court found unconstitutional in Free Speech Coaltion).
239. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 15-16 (statement of Rep. Adam Schiff).
240. Wendy Kaminer, Porn Again, AM. PROSPECr, July 1, 2002, at 9, available at 2002 WL
7761513; see Mark Alexander, The First Amendment and Problems of Political Viability: The Case
ofInternet Pornography, 25 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 977, 999, 1030 (2002) (arguing that, in the
realm of Internet pornography, Congress enacts unconstitutional laws in order to meet public
concerns after laws are found by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional).
241. Kaminer, supra note 240.
242. See id. (discussing the enactment of the Child Online Protection Act of 1997 passed in
response to the Supreme Court finding the Communications Decency Act unconstitutional. After a
federal appeals court struck down the Child Online Protection Act, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari and sent the case back to the lower courts while continuing to enjoin enforcement of the
Act).
243. See Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer).
244. Id.
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fect of postponing for conceivably six more years the ability to prosecute
those creators of child pornography whose prosecution is consistent with
the Supreme Court's view of the First Amendment. 245
C. The Easy Answer: Miller
Though the constitutionality of a COPPA-like statute is debatable,
the controversy will likely end in the Supreme Court. Given the clear
reluctance of the Court to uphold the constitutionality of the CPPA' s ban
on virtual child pornography, the best and most effective option may be
to enforce existing law and prosecute virtual child pornography as ob-
scenity.2 '4 While the Miller obscenity standard is certainly more malle-
able and less severe than Ferber's outright ban on child pornography,
much of the worst or hardest types of even virtual pornography will
likely meet the standards of obscenity. Though obscenity may not be the
most effective method for stamping out child pornography, it is one of
the few sure formulas for regulation left standing after Free Speech Coa-
lition.
As discussed above, the government may regulate obscenity under a
Miller statute if the material, taken as a whole: 1) appeals to the prurient
interest; 2) is patently offensive; 3) in light of community standards; and
4) lacks scientific, literary, artistic, or political value.247 In the realm of
child pornography, virtual or otherwise, any material, whether on a com-
puter or elsewhere, that appeals to the prurient interest in a way that of-
fends community standards and lacks social value can be regulated under
existing and well-recognized obscenity laws.248 Thus, under a Miller
statute, Congress may constitutionally prohibit the distribution of virtual
child pornography as obscenity.
While burdens of prosecuting pornographers are certainly eased un-
der Ferber and its progeny,249 a Miller obscenity statute will still reach a
great deal of virtual child pornography because most child pornography
fits within the definition of obscenity.250 Moreover, a Renaissance paint-
ing or movie like Traffic, both of which the Free Speech Coalition Court
worried might be banned under the CPPA,25' would not foster criminal
liability. Given the Court's reluctance to accept the government's argu-
ments in defense of the CPPA, addressing the problems of virtual child
245. Id.
246. Treglia, supra note 8 (arguing that state obscenity laws are still in force after Free Speech
Coalition).
247. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 246 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973)).
248. See Treglia, supra note 8.
249. See Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer).
250. See id.
251. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 241.
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pornography as obscenity and aggressively prosecuting offenders may be
the government's most viable means of regulating virtual child pornog-
raphy.
In addition to COPPA's constitutionally questionable amendments
for regulating child pornography, section five of the bill also proposed
additional and more stringent penalties for obscene materials depicting
pre-pubescent children.252 Even the Free Speech Coalition Court ac-
knowledged that the age of the persons engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct might be relevant in determining whether material is obscene. 53
Thus, more stringent penalties may be one way to combat virtual pornog-
raphy within the constitutional rubric of Miller.
The applicability and constitutional attractiveness of using a Miller
statute to regulate virtual child pornography is evident. 254 The Miller test
requires satisfaction of four prongs.255 Under Miller's first prong, mate-
rial may be obscene if it appeals to the prurient interest. 256 This prong is
to be adjudged by the trier of fact based upon whether the average person
would find the work to appeal to the prurient interest. 57 If adult pornog-
raphy can meet this first prong, certainly child pornography, whether
virtual or not, will likely be found by the average member of any com-
munity to appeal to the prurient interest in sex.
Miller's second prong requires that, for a work to be regulated as
obscenity, the material must depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way specifically defined by law. 8 The Miller Court suggested that "pat-
ently offensive" might be defined as "representations . . . of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted" or "representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the geni-
tals. 259 In the context of virtual child pornography, COPPA's definitions
of "sexually explicit conduct" likely comply with the patent offense re-
quirement. Moreover, similar descriptions were included in the proposed
Senate bill, PROTECT. In addition, Professor Schauer testified that
"there has never been any indication that the activities specified are not
within the range that a legislature may constitutionally find to be patently
252. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 5. The constitutionality of these provisions is beyond the scope of
this Comment. The significance lies in Congress's ability to set more stringent penalties for
obscenity involving children.
253. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 240.
254. Treglia, supra note 8; see Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick
Schauer) (arguing that the Senate bill, PROTECT, is constitutional because it requires that material
be obscene in its definition of covered child pornography).




259. Id. at 25.
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offensive. 26° In conjunction with this second prong, Miller also requires
that regulable obscenity be patently offensive in light of community
standards. 261 As is discussed further below, regulation of virtual child
pornography under Miller is unlikely to be hampered significantly due to
a "community standards" requirement.
Finally, Miller protects certain materials by defining as obscene
only those which, taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, scien-
tific, or political value.262 This requirement leaves open an exemption for263
a Renaissance painting, movies, and pictures in scientific texts. Con-
gress could easily rewrite a constitutional virtual child pornography stat-
ute by providing exemptions for materials with serious social value.2 4
Since virtual child pornography does not exploit actual children in the
production process, protecting works with social value does not risk fur-
ther harm to children, the basis for Ferber's ban on real child pornogra-
phy. 265 Moreover, even the Ferber Court acknowledged that there might
be instances where depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit
conduct have some social value.266 However, to protect both children and
the First Amendment simultaneously, the Ferber Court suggested spe-
cifically that youthful looking adults be used in place of children if real
scientific or artistic value would be lost without the inclusion of the
sexually explicit conduct.267 In short, Congress could constitutionally
regulate virtual child pornography so long as the statute reached only
images without serious scientific, artistic, literary, or political value.
Though virtual child pornography is regulable under a Miller ob-
scenity statute, some commentators have argued against applying the
Miller test to the context of child pornography.268 For example, in Fer-
ber, the community standards requirement was found inappropriate when
balanced against judging the primary harm to a real child in the produc-
260. Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer). Although Professor
Schauer's testimony focused on the proposed Senate bill, PROTECT, with the exception of the
proposed Senate bill's inclusion of an obscenity requirement, the descriptions of sexually explicit
material are the same for both PROTECT and COPPA.
261. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
262. Id. at 24-25.
263. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 240-41.
264. Meeting the criteria for Miller's third prong could be accomplished simply by adding a
provision to the statute that required the prosecutor to prove that the work in question lacked serious
literary, artistic, scientific or political value. See id. at 246-47 (asserting that the CPPA lacked any
accommodation for works with social value as defined by Miller).
265. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982).
266. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762-63.
267. See id. at 763.
268. See Anderson, supra note 13; Matthew K. Wegner, Note, Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks:
Why Traditional Free Speech Doctrine Supports Anti-Child-Pornography Regulations in Virtual
Reality, 85 MINN. L. REv. 2081, 2110 (2001) (citing Dennis W. Chiu, Obscenity on the Internet:
Local Community Standards for Obscenity Are Unworkable on the Information Superhighway, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 185, 188-89 (1995)).
459
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tion of child pornography.269 Avoiding the possibility that real child por-
nography might be judged obscene in one community while not in an-
other was one of the justifications the Ferber Court gave for moving
beyond the traditional obscenity test.270 In short, the Ferber Court recog-
nized the primary harm to a child in the context of real child pornogra-
phy and concluded that the government could constitutionally protect
children from this harm in every state without examining local standards
of decency.
However, in Free Speech Coalition, a majority of the Court found
no direct link between virtual child pornography and pedophilia.27 1 Thus,
after Free Speech Coalition, it will be hard to argue secondary harm to
children in virtual child pornography cases since the Court has already
272addressed and rejected this argument. Given the limitations on regulat-
ing virtual child pornography after Free Speech Coalition, as well as the
decreased fear that differing community standards might lead to vari-
ances in the primary harm to children, Miller continues to be the light at
the end of the tunnel for regulating at least some virtual child pornogra-
phy. While some virtual pornography may fall through the cracks of the
obscenity test, most communities from Bangor, Maine, to Los Angeles,
California, will find virtual depictions of children engaging in sexually
explicit conduct to be offensive.
Though the government may regulate the distribution of a substan-
tial amount of virtual child pornography as obscenity, 273 under Stanley v.
Georgia274 possession of obscenity in the home cannot be constitution-
ally prohibited. 75 This is likely one reason Congress drafted COPPA
(and the CPPA) without regard to the Miller requirements. For propo-
nents of the strict regulation of virtual child pornography, the inability to
regulate possession of explicit but virtual images of children presents a
clear problem to which there is no easy answer. Even with advances in
technology, it is easier for the government to monitor materials posted on
a Web site than to track and locate the individuals who choose to access
the Web site to view or download pornography. In addition, those dis-
tributing virtual child pornography from shops and storefronts are more
easily located than those who possess movies or magazines in their
homes. Certainly, this logistical practicality argument is of little comfort
to those who aim to stamp out the market for child pornography. How-
269. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
270. Id.
271. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250.
272. Id.
273. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 15.
274. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
275. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566.
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ever, finding and punishing the purveyors of child pornography may be
the most effective way to target the industry.
Additionally, some have argued that Miller's community standards
prong is problematic when applied to regulating the distribution of vir-
tual child pornography over the Internet.276 Matthew K. Wegner, in argu-
ing for the creation of a new category for virtual child pornography and a
.national obscenity standard, suggests that the Miller standard's focus on
local community standards is outmoded as community standards have
become increasingly global. 7 Wegner further argues that regulation of
obscenity over the Internet presents a notice problem as materials pass
jurisdictional boundaries over the Internet into communities that may
have more or less strict standards than the location from which the mate-
rial originated.278 However, if the argument supporting the globalization
of community standards is true, then it is unlikely that obscenity will be
judged differently in distinct jurisdictions. That is, if global standards
exist, material found obscene in one jurisdiction will likely be obscene in
another. In short, with the globalization of community standards the
problem of notice becomes increasingly obsolete. 9
The Miller approach, though not perfect in the context of virtual
child pornography, provides a proven method of regulating the type of
material at the heart of the CPPA and COPPA. The Ferber prohibition
on child pornography provides stronger medicine for battling the child
pornography industry.2 80 However, even under Ferber, written material
about child pornography cannot be constitutionally regulated. 28' Thus,
even the Ferber Court recognized the need to limit the application of its
decision to pornography involving and harming a real child. 82 The Free
Speech Coalition majority was unwilling to equate the primary harm to
children inherent in the Ferber rationale with the secondary effects of
virtual child pornography argued by the government.283 Without more
convincing evidence of the primary harm to children, for now, at least, it
seems that virtual child pornography has more similarities to written ma-
276. Wegner, supra note 268, at 2110 (citing Chiu, supra note 268, at 188-89).
277. Id. at 2110 (citing Chiu, supra note 268, at 215).
278. Id. (citing Chiu, supra note 268, at 188). Wegner further argues that the Supreme Court
should adopt a national obscenity standard. However, this argument has not been accepted by the
Supreme Court.
279. In other computer crimes, many states have adopted broader jurisdiction requirements that
encompass the global nature of the Internet. See Eric J. Bakewell et al., Computer Crimes, 38 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 481, 519 (2001) (citing Terrence Berg, State Criminal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Is
There a Sheriff on the Electronic Frontier?, 79 MICH. B.J. 659, 661 (2000)).
280. See Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer) (arguing that the
procedural and substantive obstacles to enforcing obscenity may make PROTECT, a bill otherwise
constitutional because of the inclusion of Miller requirements, ineffective).
281. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
282. See id. at 764.
283. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250-51.
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terial than sexually explicit images produced with real children. Given
the current backdrop, the war against child pornography-and specifi-
cally, virtual images-must be waged with Miller. In short, though
Miller may not be the best method of abolishing the market for child
pornography, it seems to be the most certain.
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of Free Speech Coalition, Congress needs to re-
think its approach to regulating virtual child pornography. Unless Con-
gress can persuade the Court that the existence of virtual child pornogra-
phy directly harms children, and legislation is necessary to enforce the
existing laws, restrictions like those in the CPPA and COPPA will likely/7.
continue to be deemed unconstitutional. Whether the Court will ever
accept that the mere existence of child pornography, virtual or real, cre-
ates direct harm to children is an open question. However, if the dire
predictions are correct and more children are molested because of the
Free Speech Coalition decision, then, absent more convincing empirical
evidence of primary harm, both the federal and state legislatures must
find a constitutional way to protect the nation's children from abuse.
Though the future is uncertain, there are strong arguments to be made
that COPPA is little more than just a loosely reworded version of the
very statute the Supreme Court struck down in Free Speech Coalition.
And while courts are attempting to determine whether the rewording
narrows the bill's application enough to pass constitutional muster, time
and resources are directed toward arguing semantics and away from
prosecuting purveyors of child pornography and obscenity.
In the end, critics of the Court's decision in Free Speech Coalition
may not be satisfied with a Miller response. Nonetheless, to be certain
that at least some, if not most, of the worst purveyors of pornography are
prosecuted, Congress should revise COPPA to comply with Miller, en-
suring that the law prohibits at least "hard core" virtual child pornogra-
phy. If existing obscenity laws are enforced effectively, the law will, as it
should, protect both the sanctity of our ideas and the innocence of our
children.
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